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Novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a new strain of coronavirus first identified in Wuhan, China. As the 17 
virus spread worldwide causing a global pandemic, China reduced transmission at considerable social 18 
and economic cost. Post-lockdown, resuming work safely, that is, while avoiding a second epidemic 19 
outbreak, is a major challenge. Exacerbating this challenge, Beijing hosts many residents and workers 20 
with origins elsewhere, making it a relatively high-risk region in which to resume work. Nevertheless, 21 
the step-by-step approach taken by Beijing appears to have been effective so far. To learn from the 22 
epidemic progression and return-to-work measures undertaken in Beijing, and to inform efforts to avoid 23 
a second outbreak of COVID-19, we simulated the epidemiological progression of COVID-19 in Beijing 24 
under the real scenario of multiple stages of resuming work. A new epidemic transmission model was 25 
developed from a modified SEIR model for SARS, tailored to the situation of Beijing and fitted using 26 
multi-source data. Because of strong spatial heterogeneity amongst the population, socio-economic 27 
factors and medical capacity of Beijing, the risk assessment was undertaken spatiotemporally with 28 
respect to each district of Beijing. The epidemic simulation confirmed that the policy of resuming work 29 
step-by step, as implemented in Beijing, was sufficient to avoid a recurrence of the epidemic. Moreover, 30 
because of the structure of the model, the simulation provided insights into the specific factors at play at 31 
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different stages of resuming work, allowing district-specific recommendations to be made with respect 1 
to monitoring at different stages of resuming work. As such, this research provides important lessons for 2 
other cities and regions dealing with outbreaks of COVID-19 and implementing return-to-work policies. 3 
 4 
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1 Introduction 7 
Novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a new strain of coronavirus with a high transmission ability that has 8 
spread widely since January 2020 (North China Morning Post 2020; Zhu et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020; 9 
Sujath et al. 2020). It is recognized as the most serious respiratory virus since the 1918 H1N1 influenza 10 
pandemic in terms of public health threat (Dorigatti et al. 2020). Since 31 December 2019, and as of 11 11 
August 2020, 20,075,600 cases of COVID-19 (in accordance with the applied case definitions in the 12 
affected countries) were reported, including 736,372 deaths (European Centre for Disease Prevention 13 
and Control 2020). With the virus has a foothold on every continent, the pandemic threat has already 14 
been realized (World Health Organization 2020a; Chien et al. 2020), and many countries have published 15 
serval pandemic-prevention measures thereafter in response, such as lockdown. However, in the post-16 
pandemic world, the reopening of society is in strong need, and the corresponding risk assessment is 17 
necessary for megacities to carefully lift the issued measures avoiding the ongoing outbreaks of COVID-18 
19. 19 
As COVID-19 has spread worldwide, China has eased transmission of the virus at considerable 20 
social and economic cost. We focus on Beijing, China because it provides an informative case showing 21 
progress from pandemic outbreak to government curbs on the pandemic, and further to the resumption 22 
of work. In fact, Beijing started to resume work on 10 February 2020 (Xinhua net 2020a), and production 23 
levels were back to 88.9% as early as 15 March 2020 (Xinhua net 2020b). As one of the largest cities in 24 
China, Beijing has 21.5 million residents, of which 7.6 million are in-migrants (domestic migrants) 25 
(Beijing Municipal Bureau Statistics 2019). This flux of migrant workers makes Beijing a high-risk 26 
region in terms of resuming work. In addition, because of the large distances between workplaces and 27 
residences in the city and the possibility of asymptomatic transmission of the virus, the ubiquity of 28 
commuting raises transmission possibilities in Beijing (Chinazzi et al. 2020; Chen et al. 2020). To begin 29 
economic recovery while maintaining a low risk of a second outbreak of COVID-19, step-by-step 30 
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measures to return to work were taken by the Beijing government. The resumption of work in Beijing 1 
could bring significant risks if not well controlled. Several existing studies showed that influenza spread 2 
has an intrinsic spatio-temporal behavior, and the diffusion of infected cases in a given area is likely to 3 
be uneven and determined by the distribution of susceptible hosts (Qian et al. 2009; Moss et al. 2019; 4 
Amorós et al. 2020). For example, individuals in schools have many more contacts with other people 5 
than those who stay at home most of the time, so regions with more schools are at higher risk. In addition, 6 
mode of employment and the scale of one’s workplace also have a great impact on the probability of 7 
infection (Aschwanden 2004). Controlling for the number of susceptible hosts, k is larger for companies 8 
operating within more confined spaces than, for example, hotels and some public places, such as parks. 9 
To analyze the goal of resuming social and economic operations while avoiding a re-outbreak of 10 
COVID-19, we conducted a simulation analysis of the risk of pandemic outbreak for Beijing at different 11 
stages of resuming work. The basic transmission model we employed is the modified SEIR model 12 
proposed by Lipsitch et al. (2003), revised according to the circumstances of the pandemic in Beijing 13 
represented using multi-source data; that is, population (residents and in-migrants), socio-economic 14 
factors and medical capacity. Although the economy is not the focus of pandemic models, it is 15 
appropriate to consider some economic impacts (Enserink and Kupferschmidt 2020), since transmitted 16 
infectious diseases can cause extensive morbidity, mortality and economic burden (Choi et al. 2008; 17 
Christakos et al. 2017). Heterogeneity exists across the districts of Beijing in the population distribution 18 
and local socio-economic factors (Song et al. 2019; Brunton et al. 2017). At different stages of resuming 19 
work, the business functions in operation vary (Beijing Youth Daily 2020), leading to different situations 20 
in different districts (i.e. different outbreak risk). Districts with large populations will not necessarily 21 
become high-risk regions, because the majority of residents will stay home for much of time if the district 22 
has few open workplaces. Thus, it is unreasonable to employ a single simulation model in developing 23 
pandemic-prevention measures for all districts (Yin et al. 2019). From this perspective, we study the risk 24 
of resuming work for each district based on the spatially heterogeneous characteristics of the population, 25 
socio-economic factors and medical capacity. In particular, two parameters of the transmission model 26 
are evaluated locally: the daily contact number per capita and the mean daily rate at which infectious 27 
cases (who are not in quarantine) are detected and isolated. Each is evaluated using district-specific socio-28 
economic factors and the medical capacity associated with the local population. Then, we produce a 29 
spatial-temporal risk assessment based on the district-specific parameters and propose relevant 30 
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pandemic-prevention measures. The overall aim is to provide valuable insights for other cities or regions 1 
anticipating the journey from pandemic outbreak to transmission prevention to resumption of socio-2 
economic activities. 3 
2. Methodology and Materials 4 
2.1 Revised SEIR model 5 
COVID-19 is a disease caused by the virus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-6 
CoV-2) (Langousis et al. 2020; Sivakumar 2020) which is genetically related to the coronavirus 7 
responsible for the SARS outbreak of 2003 (World Health Organization 2020b). To model the 8 
epidemiological progression of COVID-19, the transmission model for SARS (Lipsitch et al. 2003) was 9 
adapted. The transmission model for SARS is a modification of the standard SEIR model (Anderson and 10 
May 1991). The standard SEIR model tracks susceptible, exposed (infected but not yet infectious), 11 
infectious and recovered individuals in the compartments S, E, I and R, respectively, whereas the Lipsitch 12 
transmission model further incorporates quarantine measures into the SEIR model. Specifically, 13 
susceptible individuals are divided into ‘susceptible’ and ‘susceptible but isolated’ (compartments 𝑆𝑆 and 14 
𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄), exposed individuals are divided into ‘exposed’ and ‘exposed but isolated’ (compartments 𝐸𝐸 and 𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄) 15 
and infectious individuals are divided into ‘those who have not been isolated’ (𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈), and ‘those who have 16 
been hospitalized’ (𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷). Based on the evidence for indirect transmission resulting from transmission by 17 
asymptomatic infected persons and pre-symptomatic transmission (Cai et al. 2020; Tong et al. 2020; Bai 18 
et al. 2020; Nishiura et al. 2020; Rothe et al. 2020), we further modified the model by assuming that a 19 
fraction 𝑝𝑝 of all infectious persons are asymptomatic (1 − 𝑝𝑝 of all infectious persons are symptomatic), 20 
that a proportion 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎  of people who make contact with an asymptomatic person are infected, and a 21 
proportion 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 of people who make contact with a symptomatic person are infected. In this situation, the 22 
probability of a susceptible person becoming infected by contacting an infectious person is 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝑝𝑝) +23 
𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝, and the probability of a susceptible who makes contact not becoming infected is (1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝑝𝑝) +24 
(1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝑝𝑝. For simplicity, we use the notation 𝑏𝑏 to represent 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝑝𝑝) + 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 and 1 − 𝑏𝑏 to represent 25 
(1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝑝𝑝) + (1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝑝𝑝. In addition, we model the situation in which Beijing faces the return of 26 
considerable numbers of people from elsewhere in the country; thus, two parameters S𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  and E𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  are 27 
incorporated into the model, representing imported susceptible people and imported exposed people, 28 
respectively. That is, 29 
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d𝑆𝑆 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 − (𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏𝑏)𝑞𝑞)𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁0⁄ + 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄
d𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = (1 − 𝑏𝑏)𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁0⁄ − 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄
d𝐸𝐸 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁0⁄ − 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸
d𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑞𝑞𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁0⁄ − 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄
d𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 − (𝑣𝑣 + 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑤𝑤)𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈
d𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 − (𝑣𝑣 + 𝑚𝑚)𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷
d𝑅𝑅 d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷)
d(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) d𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝑚𝑚(𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷)
(1) 1 
It should be noted that the superscript 𝑡𝑡 in S𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  and E𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  indicates the stage of resuming work. For different 2 
stages of resuming work, there will be different populations of imported migrants. In this study, the 3 
resumption rate is reflected by the corresponding proportion of imported migrants. Moreover, during the 4 
specific stage of resuming work, the daily contact number per capita is determined by the corresponding 5 
reopened socio-economic factors, denoted by 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡. That is the parameter 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 in the revised SEIR model 6 
varies with the resumption rate, because reopened businesses at different stages of resumption have 7 
different abilities to attract people. At the initial stage of resuming work, there were only essential 8 
services reopened. To reflect the ability of these reopened essential services attracting people, we used 9 
the density of POI regarding the essential services to characterize the value of the parameter 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 for this 10 
initial stage. The mean daily rate at which infectious cases are detected and isolated is determined by the 11 
medical capacity which is denoted by 𝑤𝑤. This parameter 𝑤𝑤 is constant because medical resources were 12 
at full operation in the initial stages of resumption. The other parameters in Eq. (1) are independent of 13 
resumption rate, and are also considered constant in this study. Fig. 1 illustrate the mechanism for our 14 
transmission model. 15 
 16 
 17 




The classic SEIR model is accepted widely as a basic model to describe the properties of COVID-1 
19 transmission. Hou et al. (2020) and He et al. (2020) employed a mixed SEIR compartmental model 2 
assuming that susceptible individuals contacting an exposed individual would probably become infected. 3 
Yang et al. (2020) modified the original SEIR model, introducing move-in and move-out parameters, 4 
because the initial outbreak of COVID-19 in China occurred during the Spring Festival. At that time, 5 
hundreds of millions of people moved between the provinces of China. Despite these modifications some 6 
properties of COVID-19 transmission, particularly pandemic-prevention measures, were not considered. 7 
Therefore, here, a quarantined component is added into the classic SEIR model as a fifth element in 8 
addition to the four elements: S (susceptible), E (exposed), I (infectious) and R (recovered) (Leonardo 9 
and Xavier, 2020). Furthermore, He et al. (2002) added another element, hospitalized, representing the 10 
part of the infectious population that cannot contact other people. Infectious individuals still active in 11 
society and potentially spreading the virus should be distinguished from hospitalized infectious 12 
individuals. Wei et al. (2020) considered a more detailed scenario, where asymptomatic infected persons 13 
are introduced. In contrast, our model incorporates the above considerations into the classic SEIR model 14 
with some simplifications providing a comprehensive characterization of the properties of COVID-19 15 
transmission in Beijing. 16 
2.2 Estimating the reproductive number 17 
In the absence of quarantine, the reproductive number for this model is given by 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, where 𝑏𝑏 is 18 
the mean duration of infectiousness, 𝑏𝑏 = 1/(𝑣𝑣 + 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑤𝑤). The effect of quarantining a fraction q of 19 
contacts of infectious persons is to multiply this expression by (1 − 𝑞𝑞) (Lipsitch et al. 2003). On the 20 
other hand, the reproductive number can be calculated deterministically by the formula 𝑅𝑅 = 1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 +21 
𝑓𝑓(1 − 𝑓𝑓)(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)^2, where 𝑓𝑓 is the ratio of the infectious period to the serial interval. 𝑣𝑣 is the sum of the 22 
mean infectious and mean latent periods, and 𝑣𝑣 is the exponential growth rate of the cumulative number 23 
of cases in the pandemic (Lipsitch et al. 2003). 24 
2.3 Data collection and preprocessing 25 
Pandemic data for Beijing were collected from the website of the Beijing Municipal Health Commission 26 
(http://wjw.beijing.gov.cn/xwzx_20031/wnxw/) including daily confirmed cases, daily recovered cases 27 
and daily death cases for Beijing Municipality, as well as the total confirmed cases for each district of 28 
Beijing Municipality. The Beijing pandemic was first reported on 20 January 2020. To initialize the 29 
model, we assume that there were only exposed individuals at that time as a result of passenger inflow 30 
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from Wuhan direct to Beijing. After the travel ban from Wuhan, the growth of the pandemic in Beijing 1 
can be viewed as based on internal progression within Beijing without further imported cases (Tian et al. 2 
2020). 3 
With Beijing reopened, socio-economic factors and medical capacity within the different districts 4 
of Beijing play important roles in the evolution of the epidemic. To better describe the evolution of the 5 
epidemic in Beijing, we collected multi-source data with which to fit the revised SEIR model. Socio-6 
economic factors and medical capacity are described by the densities (pcs per square kilometer) of socio-7 
economic activity places (SEAPs) and medical services, respectively, within each district of Beijing. The 8 
density of SEAPs for each district is measured by the density of POIs (points of interest) collected from 9 
the Gaode Map API (https://lbs.amap.com/api/webservice/guide/api/search) including 10 major 10 
categories: Accommodation Services, Governmental Organization, Financial and Insurance Services, 11 
Commercial Business, Enterprises, Shopping, Food and Beverages, Transportation Services, 12 
Science/Culture and Education Services, and Sports and Recreation. Medical Services per se is a major 13 
category of the POI data. Thus, the corresponding densities were used directly to describe the medical 14 
capacity for each district.  15 
With respect to SEAPs, each major category consists of related granular categories, each of which 16 
has different population flows. Therefore, we assigned weights to the granular categories to calculate the 17 
density of each major category, specifically as the weighted average of the densities of the corresponding 18 
granular categories (see Table A2 in Appendix). For example, the major category Accommodation 19 
Services includes two granular categories, Hotel and Hostel. Because Hotel had a smaller population 20 
flow than Hostel, the weights of Hotel and Hostel were set as 0.4 and 0.6, respectively. It should be noted 21 
that the weights here represent the relative, rather than the absolute, magnitude. The densities of the other 22 
nine major categories were obtained in the same way. Next, the density of SEAPs was obtained by the 23 
weighted average of the densities of the 10 major categories, wherein the weights of the major categories 24 
were pre-defined according to their relative population flows also (see Table A2 in Appendix). Medical 25 
capacity was quantified by the density of medical services consisting of four granular categories in a 26 
similar way, but with the weights for the four granular categories of medical services pre-defined based 27 
on their theme relevance to the epidemic (see Table A2 in Appendix). For example, the largest weight 28 
was assigned to the granular category, Special Hospital, because one of the themes of it is infectious 29 
disease. The POI dataset was generated in 2017, while the acquisition time was March 2020. Population 30 
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numbers of both residents and in-migrants for each district of Beijing were collected from the Beijing 1 
Statistical Yearbook in 2019 (Beijing Municipal Bureau Statistics 2019). 2 
 3 
Table 1. Initial conditions and parameters for the Beijing pandemic. 4 
Symbol Parameter Value (𝜶𝜶 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎) Source 
𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 Susceptible but quarantined 0 Assumption 
𝐸𝐸 Exposed-infected but not yet infectious 70 Assumption 
𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 Exposed but quarantined 0 Assumption 
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 Infectious who are not yet detected and isolated 0 Assumption 
1/𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞  Duration of quarantine 14 Reference 
1/𝑟𝑟 Average time of progression from latent infection to infectious 5 Reference 
𝑚𝑚 The per capita death rate 0.0009 Reference 
𝑘𝑘 The daily number of contacts per capita 5.4668 POI 
𝑤𝑤 The mean daily rate at which infectious cases are detected and isolated 0.8579 POI 
𝑞𝑞 The fraction of all person contacted by an infectious person are successfully quarantined 0.99 ± 0.0847 Estimated 
𝑣𝑣 The per capita recovery rate 0.032 ± 0.0029 Estimated 
𝑏𝑏 The probability of transmission per contact between a susceptible and an infectious person 0.6 ± 0.1626 Estimated 
 5 
 6 
We employed non-linear least squares for parameter estimation by minimizing the distance between 7 
the predicted 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷, 𝑅𝑅, dead and corresponding observed numbers from 20 January 2020 to 20 March 2020. 8 
With respect to the parameters, the duration of quarantine, the average time of progression from latent 9 
infection to infectious, the proportion of asymptomatic cases and the per capita death rate were 10 
determined according to relevant reports (World Health Organization 2020c; Lauer et al. 2020; 11 
Mizumoto et al. 2020; Xia et al. 2020). The imported exposed population, the daily number of contacts 12 
per capita, the fraction of all persons contacted by an infectious person who are successfully quarantined, 13 
the per capita recovery rate, the transmission probability and the mean daily rate at which infectious 14 
cases are detected and isolated are estimated and given in Table 1. For each district of Beijing, we 15 
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assumed that all parameters were the same as for the greater Beijing Municipality, except the daily 1 
contact number 𝑘𝑘, detection rate 𝑤𝑤 and quarantine fraction 𝑞𝑞. The first two parameters are considered to 2 
reflect the spatial heterogeneity of people’s behavior and the medical capacity of each district. Districts 3 
with more companies and schools, for example, tend to have larger daily contact numbers. To reduce the 4 
uncertainty of the model, we employed socio-economic factors and medical capacity in the evaluation of 5 
the parameters 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑤𝑤, respectively. The socio-economic factors and medical capacity were determined 6 
by the POI data. That is the parameters 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑤𝑤 were determined by the densities of SEAPs and medical 7 
services regarding the whole Beijing Municipality. Then, the quarantine fraction 𝑞𝑞 of each district was 8 
estimated based on local pandemic data with a fixed daily contact number 𝑘𝑘 and detection rate 𝑤𝑤. Under 9 
the circumstances, we set the local resident population as the susceptible population for each district. 10 
For simplicity, the districts of Beijing Municipality are named as follows: DC (Dongcheng District); 11 
XC (Xicheng District); CY (Chaoyang District); FT (Fengtai District); SJS (Shijingshan District); HD 12 
(Haidian District); MTG (Mentougou District); FS (Fangshan District); TZ (Tongzhou District); SY 13 
(Shunyi District); CP (Changping District); DX (Daxing District); HR (Huairou District); PG (Pinggu 14 
District); MY (Miyun District); YQ (Yanqing District). 15 
3 Results 16 
3.1 Chronology of resumption of socio-economic activities 17 
To slow the pandemic, migrant residents returned to Beijing batch-by-batch in terms of their profession. 18 
Based on the timeline of resuming work (see Fig. 2), we simplify the situation into six scenarios with 19 
resumption rates from 50% to 100%: 20 
Stage 1. Resumption of work at 50% by 20 February 2020, including Accommodation Services, 21 
Governmental Organization, Financial and Insurance Services, Commercial Business, 22 
and Enterprises; 23 
Stage 2. Resumption of work at 60% by 1 March 2020. In addition to the five types of workplace 24 
mentioned above, Shopping was added, reflecting reports that around 90% of shops and 25 
markets reopened on 23 February; 26 
Stage 3. Resumption of work at 70% by 10 March 2020. In this scenario, we assume no extra 27 
categories of business resume; 28 
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Stage 4. Resumption of work at 80% by 20 March 2020. Food and Beverages were added to the 1 
resuming businesses, since it is reported that around half of the restaurants in the 2 
Chaoyang District reopened by 23 March 2020; 3 
Stage 5. Resumption of work at 90% by 30 March 2020. Transportation Services were added to 4 
the resuming businesses; 5 
Stage 6. Resumption of work at 100% by 10 April 2020. In this scenario, we assume the 6 
resumption of all business categories, where Science/Culture and Education Services 7 
and Sports and Recreation are the final two categories reopened. These two public 8 
services are more confined to places with high population mobility. 9 
 10 
 11 
Fig. 2 The timeline for resuming work in Beijing. EDZ (Economic Development Zone). 12 
 13 
At different stages of resuming work, the factors contributing to the contact number are selected 14 
based on the process in Fig. 2, leading to a heterogeneous situation (see Table 2). At a certain stage of 15 
resuming work, the parameter k is the weighted average of the densities of the selected categories of POI 16 
data within each district. The baseline represents the circumstance under the Spring Festival, when local 17 
residents stay at home with only three major categories of POI opened (i.e. Governmental Organization, 18 
Commercial Business, and Accommodation Services). At this stage, the contact number in each district 19 
is contributed by the corresponding density of open business functions and housing units. For example, 20 
within Dongcheng District, the value of parameter k is the weighted average of the densities of 21 
11 
 
Governmental organization, Commercial Business, and Accommodation Services, where the weights 1 
are pre-defined (see Table A2 in Appendix). Then, for each stage of resuming work, the parameter k for 2 
each district is calculated in the same way with corresponding reopened major categories. The parameter 3 
w represents the medical capacity to characterize the mean daily rate at which infectious cases are 4 
detected and isolated. In this research, medical capacity was captured by the density of Medical Services 5 
which can also be estimated from the POI data. It should be noted that Medical Services have been 6 
operating at full capacity through the period of this study. Therefore, the parameter w is a constant amid 7 
resuming work. As in Section 2.3, the parameter w for each district equals to the density of Medical 8 
Services within each district. 9 
 10 
Table 2. Two district-specific SEIR model parameters at different stages of resuming work. 11 
 k  
District baseline 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% w 
DC 6.814 17.500 18.485 18.485 22.611 22.625 25.294 0.694 
XC 6.166 14.355 15.431 15.431 18.929 18.939 21.503 0.702 
CY 1.204 4.612 4.897 4.897 6.357 6.361 7.264 0.130 
FT 0.982 3.094 3.369 3.369 4.295 4.300 4.853 0.115 
SJS 1.170 3.000 3.180 3.180 3.908 3.912 4.625 0.123 
HD 1.135 3.887 4.061 4.061 4.982 4.985 6.128 0.131 
MTG 0.052 0.080 0.083 0.083 0.100 0.100 0.117 0.003 
FS 0.073 0.166 0.180 0.180 0.229 0.230 0.276 0.012 
TZ 0.213 0.744 0.791 0.791 0.999 1.000 1.163 0.020 
SY 0.174 0.461 0.493 0.493 0.612 0.613 0.696 0.021 
CP 0.172 0.485 0.525 0.525 0.711 0.712 0.881 0.025 
DX 0.200 0.799 0.841 0.841 1.043 1.043 1.171 0.024 
HR 0.057 0.105 0.111 0.111 0.134 0.134 0.156 0.006 
PG 0.093 0.185 0.197 0.197 0.229 0.230 0.277 0.009 
MY 0.035 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.077 0.088 0.100 0.004 
YQ 0.023 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.044 0.050 0.058 0.002 
 12 
3.3 The impact of resuming work on virus transmission 13 
Under each scenario, the estimated total confirmed cases from 20 February to 10 April 2020 are 14 
distributed unevenly due to the heterogeneity of the multi-source data used and the step-by-step return-15 
to-work policies. After resuming work, the pandemic increases for a short period in most districts, with 16 
12 
 
the central region showing the most significant increase because of the high density of enterprises and 1 
transportation links.   2 
To characterize the real situation more closely, we introduced more parameters to the model. The 3 
model fit for the Beijing pandemic is satisfactory (see Fig. 3(a)), although it should be noted that the 4 
uncertainty for some parameters is large because imported cases are not considered by the modified SEIR 5 
model. The simulated total number of confirmed cases revealed Chaoyang District to be the highest risk 6 
region, while Fengtai District produced the most cases up to 1 Aug. 2020 (see Fig. 3(b)). Besides, the 7 
large error associated with Fengtai District in 24 Jun. is also caused by imported cases. In fact, the 8 
pandemic in Beijing appears to have a short duration. In early March 2020, the total confirmed cases 9 
within each district gradually becomes stable, and the new confirmed cases thereafter are all related to 10 
imported cases. 11 
 12 
 13 
Fig. 3 (a)-(c) Comparison between the fitted model and observed data with respect to Beijing. Id 14 
represents infectious individuals who are detected and isolated, and R represents recovered individuals. 15 
(d) Validation of the estimated total number of confirmed cases with respect to each district in Beijing. 16 
The error is calculated into absolute value to represent the size of it. 17 
 18 
Different from the total number of confirmed cases, the number of active cases is required to assess 19 
the current risk of COVID-19. Active cases refer to undetected infectious individuals, 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢, who can still 20 
come into contact with susceptible individuals, such that these susceptible people may become infected. 21 
The total number of confirmed cases consists of existing confirmed, recovered and dead cases, where 22 
clearly the latter two bring no risk to the susceptible population. The simulated evolution of active cases 23 
13 
 
of COVID-19 for each district of Beijing under different stages of return-to-work is demonstrated in Fig. 1 
4(a)-(d). Different from a simple cumulative process of total confirmed cases, confirmed active cases 2 
behave more dynamically within the process of resuming work. For example, the number of active cases 3 
in Huairou District increases at the start of resuming work, and gradually decreases in the post-resuming 4 
work stage. At the different stages of resuming work, the risk comes from different resuming business 5 
categories, influencing the spatial distribution of k and the infectious population. Enterprises and 6 
factories reopened first, as they were viewed as imperative for the domestic economy, followed by 7 
markets, the catering industry and public transportation. About 60% of economic operations resumed by 8 
1 March 2020, such that attention should be paid to towns with the most densely located shopping 9 
services. Work resumed by 80% by 20 March, such that towns with the most densely located food and 10 
beverage operations should also be monitored. When transportation returned from lockdown to full 11 
capacity, towns with more transportation services should be included for monitoring. Finally, all 12 
operations resumed by 10 April 2020, such that science/culture and education services, especially schools 13 
in Haidian District and Chaoyang District, should be included for close monitoring. In the post-COVID-14 
19 future in Beijing, we find that the epidemic can be contained (see Fig. 4(e)-(g)) based on our 15 
simulation with existing epidemic-prevention measures published in Beijing. Fig. 4(g) illustrates that 16 
there are five districts with moderate risk, seven districts with mild risk and four districts with low risk 17 
on 30 May. Southern Beijing poses a higher risk than northern Beijing, because of a high density of 18 
SEAPs. 19 
Reproductive number is an intrinsic property which characterizes the evolution of an epidemic. 20 
Table. 3 shows that the reproductive number in each district was generally lower than 1 during the 21 
resumption of work, estimated by the district-specific transmission model for quarantine. Amongst the 22 
top 10 provinces and cities with the largest numbers of total confirmed cases, Beijing moved downward 23 
in the rank list quickly (Kraemer et al. 2020). However, the risk assessment provided by the revised SEIR 24 
model provides only an empirical estimate. The small reproductive numbers for all the districts of Beijing 25 
represent that the epidemic was dying at different stages of resuming work with the step-by-step return-26 
to-work policy in Beijing. In fact, the deterministic reproductive number estimated by the pandemic data 27 
represents a similar risk pattern. The deterministic reproductive number decreases to null, because there 28 
is no evidence that the epidemic remains active in Beijing except through imported active cases. Besides, 29 
the deterministic and model-based reproductive numbers cannot be directly compared by the size of 30 
14 
 
values. The minimum deterministic reproductive number is 1 if there are any new cases. In contrast, the 1 
model-based reproductive number can close to zero when there still are new cases. It should be noted 2 
that the model-based reproductive number tends to increase with progress towards resuming work 3 
because of the increasing contact number, but the reproductive numbers are all lower than 1 because of 4 
the quarantine, which means that the epidemic is still under control. Nevertheless, the model-based 5 
reproductive number varies in the districts of Beijing because of the heterogeneous medical capacity, 6 
although the cumulative number of cases in each district is almost static. 7 
 8 
 9 
Fig. 4 Spatio-temporal prediction of the number of active cases in Beijing before and after resuming 10 
work. (a)-(d) active cases during resuming work at the 50%, 70%, 90% and 100% stages, respectively. 11 




Table 3. District-specific reproductive numbers at different stages of resuming work. 1 
 The reproductive number R 
District 
Deterministic  Model-based 
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
DC 1.47 1 1 null null null  0.28 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.40 
XC 1.77 null null null null null  0.22 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.34 
CY 1.67 2.33 null null null null  0.32 0.34 0.34 0.44 0.44 0.51 
FT 1.61 1.36 null null null null  0.24 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.37 
SJS 1.43 null null null null null  0.22 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.34 
HD 1.68 1 null 1 null null  0.27 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.43 
MTG 1.17 null null null null null  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
FS 1.44 null null null null null  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 
TZ 1.47 null null null null null  0.16 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.24 
SY 1.37 null null null null null  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.15 
CP 1.54 null null null null null  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.17 
DX 1.58 null null null null null  0.16 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.23 
HR 1.31 null null null null null  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
PG null null null null null null  0.20 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.30 
MY 1.31 null null null null null  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
YQ 1 null null null null null  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Note: The deterministic R is null means there is no case identified during the related period. 2 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 3 
Faced with the COVID-19 outbreak, a variety of different stringent measures were taken in a short time 4 
by the Chinese government (Tian S. et al. 2020; Ferretti et al. 2020). From 23 January, a total of 31 5 
provinces implemented a public health level 1 response, shutting down businesses and industry, 6 
cancelling mass gatherings and restricting movement. Medical resources were also sent from other 7 
regions of China to support Wuhan. As the capital city of China, Beijing implemented even stricter 8 
measures than other provinces, which were successful in preventing and controlling the COVID-19 9 
infection.  10 
Overall, the model-based reproductive number suggests that the quarantine and social distancing 11 
measures were effective in curbing the epidemic, while the deterministic reproductive number indicates 12 
that the epidemic is not yet dismissed in Beijing and areas with lesser medical capacity should be 13 
monitored particularly closely. To support economic recovery while minimizing disease-related risk 14 
from the outbreak, stringent measures should be taken by local governments in different regions. Regions 15 
16 
 
with high density public transportation services are suggested to strengthen public guidance, control the 1 
number of people entering stations, increase the use of temperature detection devices in stations and 2 
clean train and bus carriages before each trip. Regions with densely distributed indoor public places, such 3 
as hotels and restaurants, should pay special attention to air circulation, and surface cleaning and 4 
disinfection. In enterprises and Commercial Business, monitoring of individuals’ temperatures, strict 5 
control of the numbers of workers in confined spaces and installation of windows that can be opened for 6 
regular ventilation is encouraged (Wu et al. 2020; Hellewell et al. 2020). 7 
While there has been encouraging news that no new infections inside China are being reported, 8 
other parts of the world are becoming the new epicenters of the outbreak. Clearly, China is at a different 9 
stage in the COVID-19 pandemic cycle than many other major economies. At this time, the world’s 10 
mega-cities such as New York, Paris and London are coping with the impacts of the first wave of the 11 
pandemic. the experience of Beijing should be of great significance to other countries where the 12 
pandemic curve is still rising, especially developing regions with poor health services (Simon et al. 2005). 13 
Efforts towards economic recovery will be required for all the cities suffering from the pandemic, 14 
especially mega-cities with dense industrial and populated areas. Evidence from Beijing shows that step-15 
by-step measures can support economic recovery while avoiding a second pandemic outbreak. Beijing 16 
started resuming work on 10 February, when the number of infected cases was still rising, so only some 17 
major projects were resumed at that time. About ten days later, by February 19, some 61% of companies 18 
and industries resumed work, as the number of confirmed cases in Beijing reached 400 and stabilized. 19 
Meanwhile, some markets and shops reopened, to meet the basic requirements of daily life for people in 20 
Beijing. By 15 March, about 89% of companies and industries resumed work. Thus, the rate of resuming 21 
work in Beijing was about 10% every ten days. The model simulation undertaken here demonstrates that 22 
this pace of resuming work can be relatively effective, allowing control of the number of infections while 23 
restarting the economy as soon as possible. We hope that cities in other countries find this research useful 24 
in implementing their own policies to resume economic activity in the future. 25 
 26 
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